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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 890081-CA 
vs. : 
JOHN TIMOTHY SINGER, : Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction and final judgment 
entered against Defendant in Third Judicial District Court, in 
and for Summit County, the Honorable Michael Murphy, Judge, 
presiding. On December 22, 1988, Defendant was found guilty by a 
jury of the offense of Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, a second 
degree felony, as described in Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205 (1990). 
Sentence was imposed on January 26, 1989. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient to 
convict the Defendant of the offense of Manslaughter? 
The standard of review is that the Court views all the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, and 
will only reverse when the evidence is so inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt. State v. Booker, 
709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985); State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 
218-219 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (1988). 
2. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in 
denying Defendant's motion to suppress statements he made to law 
enforcement agents? 
An appellate court "will reverse the trial court's 
finding of a valid waiver [of Miranda rights] only if that 
finding is clearly in error or the court has abused its 
discretion." State v. Heqelman, 717 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Utah 1986) 
(citing State v. Meinhart, 617 P.2d 355 (Utah 1980)). 
As to the voluntariness of a confession, "it is the 
duty of an appellate court . . . to examine the entire record and 
make an independent determination of the ultimate issue of 
voluntariness." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 464 n.76 (Utah 
1988)(quoting Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 348 
(1976)(citation omitted)). See also State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 
886, 890 & n.ll (Utah 1989)(citing Bishop, 753 P.2d at 464 & 
n.76). However, in reviewing the findings of fact that underpin 
the trial court's decision, the appellate court determines 
whether the lower court "abused its discretion in assessing the 
evidence presented and drawing a reasonable conclusion 
therefrom." Carter, 776 P.2d at 890. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution: 
No person shall be . . . compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself. . . . 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused . . 
• . shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself. 
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, Utah 
Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1990): 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder 
in the second degree if the actor: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes 
the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily 
injury to another, he commits an act 
clearly dangerous to human life that 
causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances 
evidencing a depraved indifference to 
human life, he engages in conduct which 
creates a grave risk of death to 
another and thereby causes the death of 
another; or . . . 
Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, Utah Code Ann. §76-5-
205(1) (1990): 
Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter if the actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of 
another; or 
(b) causes the death of another under 
the influence of extreme emotion disturbance 
for which there is a reasonable explanation 
or excuse; or 
(c)causes the death of another under 
circumstances where the actor reasonably 
believes the circumstances provide a legal 
justification or excuse for his conduct 
although the conduct is not legally 
justifiable or excusable under the existing 
circumstances. 
Criminal Homicide, Negligent Homicide, Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-206(1): 
Criminal homicide constitutes negligent 
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal 
negligence, causes the death of another. 
Recklessness, Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(3): 
Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect 
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or 
the result of his conduct when he is aware of 
but consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from 
the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise under all the circumstances as 
viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
Criminal Negligence, Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4): 
With criminal negligence or is 
criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the 
result of his conduct when he ought to be 
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the circumstances exist or the result 
will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to 
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care than an ordinary 
person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant, his brother-in-law Addam Swapp, and 
Addam's brother, Jonathan Swapp, were jointly charged with one 
count of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, a 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1990) (R. 2-5). Trial 
commenced on November 25, 1988, in Summit County, Utah (R. 746). 
The jury returned its verdicts on December 22, 1988 (R. 990-993). 
Defendant and Addam Swapp were convicted of the lesser and 
included offense of Criminal Homicide, Manslaughter, a violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205 (1990) (R. 1092, 1094). Jonathan 
Swapp was convicted of Negligent Homicide, a violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (1990) (R. 1093). On January 26, 1989, the 
Defendant was sentenced to the indeterminate term as provided by 
law of not less than one nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison, to commence at the end of his federal sentence and 
be served consecutively thereto (R. 1417-1421). Addam Swapp was 
similarly sentenced to 1-15 years in prison consecutive to his 
federal sentence (R. 1422-1426). Jonathan Swapp was sentenced 
for the Class A misdemeanor offense of Negligent Homicide to one 
year in jail consecutive to his federal sentence (R. 1427-1431). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the early morning hours of January 16, 1988, Max 
Lewis, who resided across the street from the Marion Stake 
Center, in Marion, Utah, was awakened by a loud noise and the 
shaking of his house (Tr. 12-2, pp. 88) . Later that morning, 
when he went to the parking lot of the Stake Center to plow snow, 
Lewis noticed that the building had been severely damaged (Tr. 
12-2, pp. 88-89). Detective Robert Berry of the Summit County 
Sheriff's Office responded to the scene and located a large 
carved pole that had been wired to a fence on the east side of 
the Stake Center. The pole had been painted red and bore an 
inscription (Tr. 12-2, pp. 95-96). 
Near the pole, Detective Berry observed a trail in the 
snow. It consisted of several footprints proceeding in an east-
west direction. He followed the trail through a field and 
ultimately to the property occupied by the extended family of 
Vickie Singer (Tr. 12-2, pp. 96-97). Officers did not enter that 
Singer property (Tr. 12-2, p. 103). This was because several 
months earlier, on October 29, 1987, Summit County Sheriff Fred 
Transcript references refer to the date the evidence was taken. 
Eley had been ordered off the property by Addam Swapp, who had 
pointed handguns in the direction of the sheriff and a deputy, 
and fired a shot into the air as the officers were leaving, 
warning them not to come onto the property again (Tr. 12-2, pp. 
120-123). On the same day, Deputy Joe Offret of the Summit 
County Sheriff's Office contacted Addam Swapp by phone, who 
reiterated his earlier warning, stating that if officers came on 
to the property blood would be spilled and it wouldn't be his 
(Tr. 12-2, 138-141). 
After Detective Berry followed the footprints to the 
Singer property, federal authorities were contacted (Tr. 12-2, 
pp. 102-103). F.B.I. Agent Calvin Clegg was able to make 
telephonic contact with the Addam Swapp, who did not deny his 
involvement in the bombing. Swapp quoted extensively from 
scripture and indicated that his God was angry, stating that the 
scriptures were replete with references that God would pour out 
his wrath against the people who strike out against the Church of 
God (Tr. 12-2, PP. 156-157). Clegg informed Addam Swapp that the 
property was surrounded and that law enforcement wanted a 
peaceful solution (Tr. 12-2, p. 158). Clegg told Swapp he was 
concerned about the children (Tr. 12-2, p. 158). Swapp told 
Clegg that he had expected the confrontation and that the family 
was prepared for a siege and could hold out for months (Tr. 12-2, 
p. 158). After a 19-minute discussion, Swapp terminated the 
conversation (Tr. 12-2, pp. 158-159). 
The day after the bombing, Addam Swapp telephoned Chad 
Gibbs, a news reporter for KUTV news in Salt Lake City. Swapp 
acknowledged he had left at the site of the bombing a red pole 
which included the inscription "Church, state and nation shall 
now be destroyed" (Tr. 12-2, pp. 203-205). In his prepared 
statement, Swapp made scriptural references to the Lord fighting 
their battles and the sword falling on their enemies (Tr. 12-2, 
p. 208). 
Over the ensuing thirteen days numerous federal law 
enforcement agents were assigned to the standoff at Marion, Utah. 
Due to the presence of a number of young children (Exhibit P-19), 
strict rules of engagement were imposed upon the officers. Under 
no circumstances was the Singer residence to be fired upon, even 
if officers themselves were under fire from the house (Tr. 12-2, 
pp. 234-235). 
At various times throughout the standoff, law 
enforcement authorities set up lights and played loud noises 
through speaker systems. The speakers were not used until 
approximately one week into the standoff (Tr. 12-5, p. 98; Tr. 
12-14, p. 219). The placement of the lights and speakers was 
undertaken at the suggestion of Duane Fuselier, an F.B.I. Agent 
and psychologist who was brought to the scene to help bring a 
peaceful end to the crisis. He suggested the use of the lights 
for security and tactical reasons, and felt the noise would be a 
way of prodding the family to at least communicate with the 
officers (Tr. 12-5, pp. 97-98). 
Throughout the standoff, Addam and Jonathan Swapp 
openly carried firearms when they were outside the residence 
(Tr. 12-5, pp. 7-8, 26-28, 30-31, 39-47) (Exhibits 12 to 19). 
Firearms were discharged from the Singer property on numerous 
occasions. Several times rounds were fired from the Singer 
residence and elsewhere at lights, generators and other equipment 
set up to assist in the effort to bring the standoff to an end. 
At times, shots were fired at positions occupied by federal 
officers (Tr. 12-5, pp. 8-9, 15-16; Tr. 12-2, 248-249, Tr. 12-7, 
pp. 235-236). On two occasions, Jonathan Swapp pointed his 
rifle in the direction of F.B.I, agents (Tr. 12-2, p. 251; Tr. 
12-5, p. 47). On one occasion, an F.B.I, agent observed 
Defendant John Timothy Singer outside the back door of the Singer 
house in his wheelchair in possession of a rifle (Tr. 12-5, p. 
44). 
Authorities continued to try to negotiate with the 
occupants of the property. On January 20, 1988, a letter from 
the ATF Special Agent in charge, Nolan Douglas, was dropped onto 
the property from a helicopter (Tr. 12-2, pp. 219-220). The 
letter stated that Addam Swapp and Vickie Singer had been 
indicted by a federal grand jury, that arrest warrants were 
outstanding for the two, and that a federal judge had ordered 
them to immediately come out. Douglas expressed concern for the 
family, especially the children, and encouraged the family to 
pick up the telephone and talk to work the situation out 
peacefully (Exhibit C-2). The family gave no response to 
Douglas' letter (Tr. 12-14, p. 228). 
On January 25, 1988, Ogden Kraut, a friend of the 
Singer family, was allowed onto the property to act as an 
intermediary (Tr. 12-5, pp. 231-234). He went in on three 
occasions. On his first visit, Kraut asked Addam Swapp why he 
had guns, and if he intended to shoot anyone. Swapp responded, 
"No, not unless they come over the fence." He told Kraut that 
part of his revelation was that there would be a confrontation 
and bloodshed there (Tr. 12-5, p. 242), and that the family was 
expecting John Singer to be resurrected from the dead as a result 
of the confrontation with the authorities (Tr. 12-5, p. 239). 
The following day, on January 26, 1988, ten days into 
the standoff, the authorities had Kraut deliver a letter from 
Utah Governor Norman Bangerter to the family, urging the 
occupants to peacefully end the standoff, if only for the sake of 
the small children who were inside the Singer residence with the 
Defendants (Exhibit C-8). Kraut described Addam as being armed 
like a "Mexican bandito" with a band of bullets across his chest 
and waist, a pistol on each side, a long knife and a rifle. 
Kraut told Addam Swapp it was not his mission to make war (Tr. 
12-5, p. 251). Kraut returned the next day, January 27, 1988, 
and was given handwritten letters to the Governor from Defendant 
Addam Swapp and from Vickie Singer (Tr. 12-5, pp. 260-262). On 
either his second or third visit, Kraut told Addam Swapp that he 
would "either have a big revelation up here or a catastrophe," to 
which Swapp responded, "That's right." (Tr. 12-5, p. 253) 
In his letter to the Governor, Addam Swapp stated that 
he did not recognize the authority of the government, and 
declared the Singer property an independent nation. He commanded 
law enforcement to leave the valley immediately, threatening 
destruction in the name of the Lord. In the P.S. to the letter 
he stated: "TAKE A WARNING - any man of yours who attempts to 
cross the Boundaries of this place, without our Permission, will 
be treated as an agressive [sic] act on your part against us and 
we will defend ourselves in any manner we see fit. • . ." 
(Exhibit C-9, page 6) (Tr. 12-5, pp. 114-120). 
Discouraged by the letters they received, officers 
decided to attempt an arrest. Their belief was that Addam Swapp 
was the leader on the property (Tr. 12-5, p. 141), and that if he 
was captured, the other family members would surrender and the 
standoff would end, which proved prophetic (Tr. 12-5, pp. 123-
125; Tr. 12-14, p. 274-275). 
The first arrest plan involved the use of the noise 
producing speakers as decoys. The agents were aware that when 
noise had previously been broadcast, the Swapp brothers would 
venture off the property and disable the speakers by firing into 
them. Members of the F.B.I. Hostage Rescue Team and Utah State 
Corrections Department dog handlers would be in the area when the 
Swapp brothers left the property. The dogs would be released and 
take down the Swapp brothers (Tr. 12-5, p. 289-292). When the 
speakers were activated the Swapp brothers did respond as 
anticipated (Tr. 12-5, pp. 298-299). However, when the dogs were 
released they did not attack the Swapp brothers. One of the dogs 
began to attack one of the agents, the other ran a few yards and 
returned to his handler. After disabling the speakers by 
shooting them with firearms, the Swapps retreated to the Singer 
house (Tr. 12-7, pp. 232-233, 251). 
In conjunction with this first plan, several F.B.I, 
agents assigned to the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and Corrections 
dog handler Fred House had entered the house on the west side of 
the Singer property, known as the Bates house, at about 10:00 
p.m. on January 27 (Tr. 12-7, pp. 9-10). Agents had previously 
observed family members, including the Swapp brothers, enter the 
house during the previous twelve days. In the event that the 
Swapp brothers entered the Bates house on the morning of the 
28th, agents would be in a position to effect an arrest (Tr. 12-
5, p. 291). 
When the first arrest attempt failed, a second plan was 
put into effect. The agents were aware that the Swapp brothers 
went to milk the family goat every morning. The goat pen was 
located approximately one-half way between the Bates and Singer 
houses. The new plan was to release the dogs from the front door 
of the Bates house as the Swapp brothers left the goat pen. The 
dogs were to take the Swapps to the ground, after which the 
officers would move in and effect the arrest without the 
necessity of firing a shot (Tr. 12-6, pp. 37, 41). 
At about 8:30 a.m. on January 28, 1988, Addam and 
Jonathan Swapp left the Singer house to milk the goat. As usual, 
both were armed. Utah Department of Corrections dog handlers 
Jerry Pope and Fred House moved to the front door of the Bates 
house when the Swapp brothers approached the goat pen (Tr. 12-6, 
vol II, p. 76). After they finished the milking, they began 
walking from the goat pen located midway between the Bates home 
and the Singer house towards the Singer house. The door was 
opened and the dogs were released. At that time, F.B.I, agents 
John Butler and Martin Brown were positioned behind Pope and 
House to provide cover (Tr. 12-7, pp. 150-151). Butler and Brown 
were armed with 9mm rifles (Tr. 12-7, p. 134). Agents David 
Edward and Richard Intellini, also armed, were lying prone on a 
second floor landing of the Bates house looking out a window that 
faced the Singer house (Tr. 12-7, pp. 22-24). 
As the dogs were released, Lt. House was crouched 
slightly in the doorway with his right side exposed to the Singer 
house (Tr. 12-7, p. 184). Shortly after the dogs were released, 
gunfire erupted from the Singer house. A volley of three shots 
was fired (Exhibit E-4). Almost simultaneously, agents in the 
Bates house observed Addam Swapp pull his 30-06 rifle off his 
shoulder, spin around to face the Bates house, and bring his 
rifle into a firing position. Agents Butler and Intellini each 
fired one shot almost simultaneously at Addam Swapp, who fell to 
the ground (Tr. 12-7, pp. 156-160; Tr. 12-6, p. 94; Tr. 12-7, p. 
29). Agent Butler's round entered Addam Swapp's wrist, traveled 
through his arm into his chest and lodged in his back (Tr. 12-14, 
pp. 86-90). Agent Intellini's round struck the inside of a 
window frame in the Bates house (Tr. 12-6, p. 95). 
After firing his shot, Agent Butler grabbed Pope and pulled him 
to safety into the stairwell (Tr. 12-7, p. 160). 
Just after the agents fired, a series of four and then 
three rounds (Exhibit E-4) were fired from the Singer house and 
the northeast corner of the house. Just before the last volley, 
F.B.I. Agent Hal Metcalf, who was looking out a window in the 
Jepsen home to the west of the Bates house, saw Jonathan Swapp 
kneeling at the northeast corner of the Singer house, pointing a 
rifle in his direction. Agent Metcalf dove for cover as rounds 
hit the Jepsen home (Tr. 12-7, p. 205; Tr. 12-8, p. 17). 
Shortly after the gunfire erupted, agents noticed that 
Fred House had been hit and had slumped to the ground (Tr. 12-6, 
vol. II, p. 37). Agent Intellini called out to him to hold on, 
that they'd get him out of there (Tr. 12-6, p. 96). The dogs, 
who had become disoriented and apparently never keyed on the 
Swapp brothers, re-entered the Bates house as Agent Hugh McKinney 
made his way down the stairs to give House first aid (Tr. 12-7, 
pp. 29-30). About that same time more shots were hitting the 
partially open front door (Tr. 12-7, pp. 99-100). Lt. House had 
slumped back into a closet near the doorway with his feet 
blocking the doorway (Tr. 12-7, p. 162). While making his way to 
Lt. House, McKinney, lying prone, heard the snap of bullets 
passing over his head (Tr. 12-7, P. 113). McKinney managed to 
pull Lt. House's feet from in front of the door and Butler was 
able to close it with the handle of a mop (Tr. 12-7, p. 100). 
Once the door was closed no more rounds entered the Bates house. 
McKinney administered first aid to Lt. House, but he did not 
respond (Tr. 12-7, pp. 101-102). 
After the shooting stopped, Addam Swapp, who was 
wounded and had retreated into the Singer house, was observed 
approaching the Bates house unarmed (Tr. 12-7, pp. 241-242). 
Agents ordered him to lie on the ground where he was given 
medical attention (Tr. 12-7, pp. 264-270, 171-172). At about the 
same time, armored personnel carriers (APCs) entered the 
property. One blocked the northwest window of the Singer house 
from which shots were fired, where Agent Dave Shepherd observed 
Defendant Singer through the window (Tr. 12-7, pp. 68-69). The 
other APC used to evacuate the injured Fred House (Tr. 12-6, p. 
24), after which the APC returned and was used to evacuate Addam 
Swapp to a nearby ambulance (Tr. 12-7, 172-173). Shortly 
afterwards, F.B.I, agents received a telephone call from Jonathan 
Swapp, who had hooked up the phone again. Jonathan indicated 
that the family was willing to surrender (Tr. 12-5, pp. 124-126). 
Thereafter, Jonathan Swapp, together with Defendant John Timothy 
Singer and the other members of the Singer family left the house 
and surrendered themselves to federal custody. When he 
surrendered, Defendant Singer had 2 gun holsters strapped to his 
wheelchair (Tr. 12-9, p. 67). 
Lt. Fred House was pronounced dead on arrival at the 
University of Utah Medical Center on January 28, 1988 (Tr. 12-8, 
p. 145). The State Medical Examiner, Dr. Edwin Sweeney, 
testified that Lt. House died as a result of a single gunshot 
wound to his chest (Tr. 12-8, p. 153). The projectile entered 
Lt. House's chest directly below the right nipple and travelled 
backward and downward from right to left (Tr. 12-8, p. 151). The 
projectile nicked the aorta, which caused the death (Tr. 12-8, p. 
152). 
Ten expended .30 caliber bullets were recovered after 
the shooting (Exhibits B-l through B-9, and B-37). Seven were 
fired from Defendant John Timothy Singer's Plainfield carbine 
(Tr. 12-13, p. 273), which was located on a table in Defendant 
Singer's bedroom at the north end annex of the Singer house (Tr. 
12-13, pp. 157-159). That Plainfield .30 caliber carbine had 
been purchased from a gun shop in West Valley City by Defendant 
Singer in January of 1988, after which he took the rifle back to 
the gun shop for repair and picked it up shortly before the 
church was bombed (Tr. 12-9, pp. 90-92, 98-103). 
Of the seven rounds fired from Defendant Singer's 
rifle, one was recovered from the floor of the Bates house in the 
same location where HRT members had removed Lt. House's clothing 
and administered first aid (Tr. 12-7, p. 289). A substance found 
on that projectile tested positive for type 0 human blood, 
consistent with the blood found on the shirt of the victim (Tr. 
12-8, pp. 58-61). Another round was found in the jacket of 
F.B.I. Agent Don Roberts, who was in the Jepsen home when the 
shooting started and was hit by a round, but not injured because 
he was wearing a bullet-proof vest (Tr. 12-8, p. 17-32). Four 
other rounds were recovered from inside the Bates house (Tr. 12-
7, pp. 282-290; Tr. 12-8, pp. 73-74). A seventh round was taken 
from a vehicle which was parked in the driveway of the Jepsen 
house during the shooting (Tr. 12-8, pp. 12-13). 
Two .30 caliber rounds fired from Jonathan Swapp's 
Alpine carbine were recovered from the Jepsen garage (Tr. 12-7, 
p. 296; Tr. 12-8, p. 7; Tr. 12-13, p. 265). A third round was 
recovered from a first floor ceiling joist in the Bates house 
(Tr. 12-8, pp. 186-189). Two expended .30 caliber casings which 
had been ejected from the Alpine carbine were found on the ground 
in the snow at the northeast corner of the Singer house in the 
area where Agent Metcalf had seen Jonathan Swapp kneel and point 
his rifle (Tr. 12-8, p. 183). Firearms identification and 
trajectory analysis evidence revealed that the rounds fired from 
the Alpine rifle at the northeast corner of the Singer house went 
through the doorway of the Bates house, passed through the narrow 
corridor where the agents were scrambling for cover, exited 
through a rear window, and ultimately lodged where they were 
found in the garage of the Jepsen house (Tr. 12-13, pp. 256-257). 
After the occupants surrendered, search warrants were 
executed on the Singer property and structures, including the 
Singer house. The agents searching that house discovered a 
virtual arsenal in that dwelling (Exhibit D-6.2). Firearms and 
ammunition were found in positions close to windows and makeshift 
gun ports. A total of twenty-three handguns, shotguns and 
rifles, including Defendant Singer's Plainfield .30 caliber 
carbine and Jonathan Swapp's Alpine .30 cal. carbine (from which 
the rounds were earlier fired) were recovered from the residence 
and property (Tr. 12-13, pp. 132-187). Several of the rifles, 
including the Plainfield and Alpine .30 caliber carbines, were 
recovered from Defendant Singer's bedroom at the north annex of 
the Singer house (Exhibit P-44). Eight thousand three hundred 
and four (8,304) rounds of ammunition were found stacked in 
places within the residence where they could be easily reached 
for reloading (Tr. 12-13, p. 186; Tr. 12-14, p. 261). Of the 
twenty-three firearms recovered, twenty-one were fully 
functional, seventeen were loaded when seized, and sixteen had no 
safety or had the safeties off (Tr. 12-13, pp. 132-187). Addam 
Swapp's .30-06 was found where he had fallen. It was loaded, 
with one round chambered and seven rounds in the clip. The 
safety was off (Tr. 12-13, pp. 172-173). 
Following his arrest, Defendant Singer was given a 
Miranda warning, waived his rights, and gave a statement to 
officers wherein he admitted that he was seated in his wheelchair 
in his bedroom looking out his window in the Singer home when 
Addam and Jonathan Swapp went out to milk the goat on January 28, 
1988. He said that when he saw dogs running from the Bates house 
he grabbed his rifle and fired at the dogs. He denied firing at 
any people (Tr. 12-9, pp. 55-81; Exhibit E-7). 
Additional facts upon which the State relies in support 
of its arguments are presented throughout the argument portion of 
this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Evidence at trial was sufficient to establish all 
elements of the offense of manslaughter. The Defendant requested 
and received a lesser included instruction concerning negligent 
homicide, which was rejected by the jury. When placed in 
context, the Defendant's actions, in firing his rifle repeatedly 
in the direction of officers who were attempting to arrest Addam 
and Jonathan Swapp, and which firing resulted directly in the 
death of Officer Fred House, was at a minimum reckless, 
supporting his conviction for manslaughter. 
2. The trial court properly denied the Defendant's 
motion to suppress statements he made to law enforcement 
officers. Such statements were made after he was fully advised 
of his Miranda warning and waived his rights. The one time that 
he indicated he did not feel like talking anymore, the officers 
scrupulously honored his request and asked him no more questions 
concerning the events in question. After a three minute casual 
conversation which was not interrogation or its functional 
equivalent, the Defendant himself re-initiated further discussion 
by telling the agents that maybe he would tell them the whole 
story. The trial court found that the agents used no trickery or 
coercion, made no promises or threats, and that the Defendant's 
statements were freely and voluntarily made after a complete 
advisement and waiver of his rights. The record supports the 
trial court's ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR MANSLAUGHTER. 
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence 
to convict him of manslaughter, and urges this Court to lower the 
level of his conviction to negligent homicide, a class A 
misdemeanor. The standard of review is that the Court views all 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, and 
will only reverse when the evidence •• '.n in m • 1 ni1"-. i v c < > c 
inherent l\ npi u k m i c IMI reasonajoie minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt as in a defendant's guil* !,s* ••• it t>iiou 
not substitute its judgment ^n a« there 
I mini i - i ill 111. -i in J tiding reasonable .nierences 
findings of all the requisite elements f t v>«. -ffer^-
reasonably be made. State y. Buokej ui i n H - M'J (Utah 
1 9B",) , 
As eliminary matter,- the Defendant nevei I'CJIM M I 
this issup *--*•- , in, i m i I, , ,,i, j,,| mi I s c o n v i c t i o n f and 
thei ef «,i»i fc , ... arguably waivea ' 1 . 11 t:
 A-I court should have 
been given .-: opportunity to pc * 
level * -md II i,.>.„„„ . aever raised any issue 
regarding the sufficiency of the evidence bet . The Defendant 
should not be allowed to raise such a mati , i,| | , , s i I miiie 
on appe,i ' ,,i>e Stale v, bleqqell, bbl! I'.2d 252 (Utah 1983). 
IF any pvent , the Defendant's argumf- - ^ ithout 
merit, His argument is premise.I M I II ,i i naware 
1
 . i pa l*r 11 rtla ii lie fired ten rounds from his rifle on 
the morning I .liWiuary 28, 1 y H 8, resuJting in the dfvit h of 
Officer House, When those evenly .ire pi I inlr llii'ii [ a rg er 
contf"«« i i ' , ii argument is unsound. 
Batje*j upon the Defendant's statements, to mjnnt F. ilu" 
following pi ct ure emerqc i ,«' in " r 11,111• | i • I I 111, • i, 1111uting, 
iliii Leen d a y s into the armed l e s i s t a n c e , the D e f e n d a n t w a s 
sitting watching out. his bedroom window as Addam and .'lonaf liiin 
Swapp went out to milk the goat (Tr. 12-9, p. 64). Earlier that 
morning, police dogs had been sent in an effort to arrest Addam 
and Jonathan Swapp, and the Defendant was aware of that incident 
(Tr. 12-9, p. 63). The Defendant was armed with his .30 caliber 
carbine rifle, which was loaded with ten rounds. He was familiar 
with the rifle and knew that if loaded to its 15-round capacity 
it would jam (Tr. 12-9, p. 65). This was the same rifle he had 
purchased shortly before the standoff began, and which he had 
taken back to the gun shop for repairs, insisting that he needed 
it back before the weekend (of the bombing) (Tr. 12-9, pp. 90-92, 
98-103). Although his view to the west was partially blocked by 
a pine tree, he had a "pretty good view" of the Bates house from 
his window (Tr. 12-9, p. 65). 
As he sat at the window, he was aware that law 
enforcement officers surrounded the house. He had watched news 
reports on television, and knew that officers were located down 
below (Tr. 12-9, p. 62). [The Bates and Jepsen houses were 
located down below and to the west were the Bates and Jepsen 
houses - See Exhibit D-l for elevation indicators showing ground 
slopes down to the west from the Singer house.] (See also Exhibit 
E-7, audio tape of Defendant's statements to officers.) 
Defendant told the agents that just before he fired he 
saw the door to the Bates house open and close, then saw two dogs 
running up the path, heard two or three shots, and then saw the 
door close. At this time he said he took his carbine and shot in 
the direction of the dogs (Tr. 12-9, p. 66). He told agents that 
based on the incident that happened during the night, he knew 
that somebody had to be there with the dogs (Tr. 12-9, p. 84), 
and that they had to be law enforcement officers (Exhibit E-7). 
Finally, he told agents that he didn't need to be a good marksman 
because the Lord guided him (Tr. 12-9, p. 66). 
When placed in context it is clear that, at a 
minimum, Defendant acted recklessly when he fired in the 
direction of officers, whether or not he could see them or was 
specifically aiming at them. He could not have failed to 
recognize that agents were in the Bates house. The first 
indication that agents were in the house was that the door was 
open and that dogs were proceeding up a path directly in front of 
the house. Even more significantly, the Defendant acknowledged 
that he saw the door close, and observed movement (Tr. 12-9, p. 
79). He also told the officers in his taped statement that he 
heard shots before he fired and believed the shots came from the 
Bates house because the door was open (Exhibit E-7). Although he 
now characterizes his admission that he knew that officers were 
in the Bates house as the product of leading questions by the 
agents, the record does not bear him out. Defendant in his brief 
also asserts that he indicated (presumably to officers) that he 
was not actually aware, but ought to have been aware, that people 
were in his line of fire. No such statement was ever made by the 
Defendant to any agent in this case. 
In assessing his conduct, it should also be noted that 
the Defendant certainly knew that officers were down in the 
Jepsen house, which was in a direct line of fire to the west of 
the Bates house. Officers had been stationed in the Jepsen house 
throughout the 13-day standoff, and were seen on several 
occasions by the occupants of the Singer property (Tr. 12-2, pp. 
237, 251; Exhibit E-7). 
The pattern of shots fired by the Defendant is telling. 
He put four rounds through the front door of the Bates house in a 
very tight pattern. The door was partially open and these four 
shots all struck the door at lethal levels (Exhibit B-23). 
Officer House, who was located just to the side of the open door, 
and who had opened it, was struck by one of the initial rounds 
which the Defendant fired (Tr. 12-7, pp. 151-152). Two more 
rounds which the Defendant fired went just to the left of the 
open doorway, one ricocheting off the south side of the Bates 
house and one striking the kitchen window of the Jepsen house, 
which went through the wall and hit Agent Don Roberts, who was 
knocked to the ground (Tr. 12-8, pp. 12-13, 17-32). 
Perhaps more telling even than the pattern is the 
timing of the shots, apparent from reviewing the videotape which 
was taken during the shootout by a reserve deputy from the Summit 
County Sheriff's Office (Exhibit E-4). In that videotape, one 
can clearly hear the sequence of the shots fired. After the 
first three shots which the Defendant fired in rapid succession, 
the agents in the Bates house fired at Addam Swapp, who had 
turned towards the Bates house and shouldered his weapon. After 
those simultaneous shots, the Defendant fired four more times. 
These shots, as evidenced by the videotape, are more deliberate 
than the first, and are evenly spaced• They are the rounds that 
continued to impact into the Bates house while Agent McKinney was 
trying to get to Fred House to render assistance and first aid 
(Tr. 12-7, pp. 99-100). (The final three shots audible on the 
tape were apparently fired by Jonathan Swapp from a position 
outside the northwest corner of the Singer house, as explained 
above.) 
These last four rounds which the Defendant fired belie 
his characterization that he was just firing at dogs unaware that 
men were behind them. The dogs never keyed on their targets and 
only went out a short distance. They never got near the Swapp 
brothers and reentered the Bates house before the agents closed 
the door. Yet the Defendant put four rounds in a tight pattern 
through the partially open door of the Bates house while agents 
were scrambling to attend Officer House (Tr. 12-7, p. 100; 
Exhibit B-23). 
The Defendant's actions, including his continuing to 
direct shots down towards the Bates house after the initial 
volley was fired, are the best indicator of his state of mind. 
Firing a deadly weapon under such circumstances, even if one 
accepts his claim that he was not shooting at or attempting to 
harm any person, is clearly reckless. 
Defendant cites State v. Howard/ 597 P.2d 878 (Utah 
1979), for the proposition that the focus of the inquiry in a 
negligent homicide case is the intended and not the actual victim 
of the defendant• While Howard does discuss negligent homicide, 
it is in the context of the trial court's refusal to give a 
negligent homicide instruction, which the court upheld, since the 
evidence did not support it. Howard involved a second degree 
murder and manslaughter conviction where the defendant aimed at 
one person and hit another, thereby invoking the doctrine of 
transferred intent. Ld. at 881. That doctrine is inapplicable 
to the present case, since the Defendant has always asserted that 
he did not intend to shoot at anyone. 
The jury verdict in this case gave the Defendant the 
benefit of the doubt that he may not have been directly firing at 
officers with the intent to kill or injure them, but his conduct 
of firing his rifle cannot be characterized as anything less than 
reckless. The trial court may have been justified in not even 
instructing the jury on negligent homicide, given the evidence 
presented at trial, since under no rational view of the evidence 
could the Defendant's conduct have constituted only criminal 
negligence. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 453 (Utah 1986). 
The jury rejected Defendant's claim that he was guilty 
of nothing more than negligent homicide, and convicted him of 
manslaughter. That verdict is supported by the evidence and 
should not be disturbed on appeal. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS 
HE MADE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS SINCE 
SUCH STATEMENTS WERE NEITHER INVOLUNTARY NOR 
TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS. 
After being taken into custody, Defendant Singer was 
transported from Marion to Salt Lake City by agents of the Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (hereafter "A.T.F."), Allan 
Galyan and Felix Garcia (R. 1476, p. 196). Both agents were 
introduced to the defendant as A.T.F. agents prior to leaving 
Marion to drive to Salt Lake City (R. 1476, p. 197). Agent 
Galyan was wearing an A.T.F. raid jacket which had a badge in the 
upper left-hand corner in the front and the initials A.T & F. on 
the back (R. 1476, p. 197). Agent Garcia was wearing a rain 
jacket with a United States Treasury seal and the letters A.T.F. 
on both the front and back (R. 1476, p. 225). Agent Galyan 
showed the Defendant his badge and his credentials (R. 1476, p. 
197). He advised the Defendant of his rights as per Miranda by 
reading to him A.T.F. form 3200.4, "Waiver of Right to Remain 
Silent and of Right to Advice of Counsel" (Exhibit C-10)(R. 1476, 
p. 198). Galyan discussed each paragraph of the statement of 
right portion of the form with the Defendant to verify he 
understood his rights. He had the defendant read along as he 
read the form, and also had him read the form himself, partly out 
loud so that Galyan could verify that the Defendant could read 
(R. 1476, pp. 198-199). Agent Galyan went beyond what was on the 
form and discussed each paragraph with the defendant as he read 
it (R. 1476, pp. 213-214)• The Defendant stated that he 
understood his rights and then signed the statement of rights 
portion of the form (R. 1476, p. 199). The time was about 10:02 
a.m. (Exhibit C-10). 
Galyan then told the Defendant that he wanted to talk 
to him about the bombing of the church and events that occurred 
around his residence since the time of the bombing (R. 14 76, p. 
200). The Defendant stated he would answer some of the 
questions, at which time he signed the waiver portion of the form 
(R. 1476, pp. 199-200). Galyan then asked the Defendant what he 
knew about the church bombing. The Defendant stated, "What do I 
know? What do you know? You ask the questions and see if I can 
answer them.'1 He thereafter responded to certain questions about 
the bombing (R. 1476, pp. 201-202). 
About seven minutes after the questioning began, the 
Defendant told Galyan that he didn't know if he felt like talking 
to him (R. 1476, p. 202), at which point Galyan stopped talking 
to him (R. 1476, pp. 202, 222). After a brief period of silence, 
Agent Garcia engaged Galyan and then the Defendant in casual 
conversation, such as mentioning that he, Garcia, was very tired 
and would be glad to get back home to his family in Texas (R. 
1476, p. 223). 
About three minutes into such casual conversation, at 
about 10:12 a.m., the Defendant told the agents that maybe he 
would tell them the whole story (R. 1476, p. 203). During the 
three minute period, no promises or threats were made in order to 
persuade the Defendant to make any statements, nor was he misled 
or tricked by the agents (R. 1476, pp. 203, 224). Further, Agent 
Garcia did not ask any questions whatsoever of an investigative 
nature during this brief period of time (R. 1476, pp. 237-238). 
After indicating his willingness to discuss the 
incidents, and during the rest of the drive down to Salt Lake, 
the Defendant spoke freely and answered questions from Agent 
Garcia, who asked most of the questions (R. 1476, p. 224). The 
Defendant appeared calm and cooperative (R. 1476, p. 204), and 
seemed to want to talk and get things off his chest (R. 1476, p. 
224) . 
After they reached Salt Lake City, the agents took the 
Defendant to the United States Marshal's Office, where they met 
two agents of the Utah State Attorney General's Office, Ron 
Miller and Sharon Esplin (R. 1476, p. 226). Miller and Esplin 
were there for the purpose of conducting a taped interview with 
the Defendant, which was commenced at about 11:39 a.m. (R. 1476, 
p. 226). As the interview began, Miller and Esplin introduced 
themselves to the Defendant, and Garcia, who was also present, 
stated, "okay, as the other agent and I came in, we read you your 
rights. You are aware of your rights, is this correct?" The 
Defendant responded, "Right." Garcia then said, "Okay. We told 
you that when we got here we would want to write down what you 
told us. . . ." To which the Defendant also responded "Right." 
Garcia asked him to relate to the State agents the same things 
they had been talking about in the car on the way down from 
Marion. The Defendant indicated to "go ahead and ask questions," 
after which the interview proceeded (Exhibit E-7). 
Garcia then asked questions, after which Miller did 
some questioning, and the interview concluded at about 1:18 p.m. 
(R. 1476, p. 226). The Defendant spoke freely and responded to 
questions (R. 1476, pp. 227, 245). At one point in the interview 
Miller asked the Defendant if he would like to take a food break, 
which he declined (R. 1476, pp. 228, 245). Miller asked him if 
it was all right to continue, and the Defendant said it was (R. 
1476, p. 246). 
At no time were any threats or promises made to the 
Defendant (R. 1476, pp. 203, 224). At no time did he request 
counsel (R. 1476, pp. 204, 225, 245). None of the agents who 
interviewed the Defendant perceived him as either confused or 
mentally retarded (R. 1476, pp. 204-205, 225-226, 247). Agent 
Garcia, who participated in both interviews, testified that the 
way the Defendant spoke during the taped interview was the exact 
way he discussed the events in the car earlier on the way down to 
Salt Lake (R. 1476, p. 227). 
Prior to trial, Defendant Singer filed a motion to 
suppress his statements to the agents (R. 228-229), and a 
transcript of a prior evidentiary hearing in Federal Court was 
admitted into evidence by stipulation (Tr. 11-16, p. 4). At that 
prior hearing, the Defendant testified. Although the Defendant 
claimed that he had been confused as to whether the agents to 
whom he made statements were police officers (R. 1476, pp. 110-
Ill), when asked by his attorney whether he recalled the officers 
giving him a warning n^+- * 
i, . a counsel and things like that", the Defendant responded, 
"Yes, - "•• ' iid." (R. 1476, p. KIM). 
On : • •* *• - I .ion, the Pet endant: admitted that he 
was aware that he was surrendering to law enforcement officers 
(R. 1476, pp. ll"-118)f that there were quite a few of them and 
j.ie w a s s officers because he had been 
watching television news reports during the 13-day standoff iR, 
1476, pp. 118, 122), that the officers who spuU- f h i m ,l" i<l 
h a v e " > •- Miranda warning (R. 14 7b! p. 1 i H ), , and that 
they did give r... .-.-•.- *o did sign I n two places a written 
document concerning his Miranda rights ( n.'xh i l)j i i. --in, "Wai ver of 
HiyI,! I1 Remain Siltsnl and of Right to Advice of Counsel") which 
he "could have" discussed with the agents < +'*K>, p. 119). He 
also acknowledged that someone as he was 
r.i.djng ,in the cai train Marion *. . : ,ake Cit. n i7fc,
 r 
120) The Defendant further stated that *> was able tc 
1476, p. 1IJ | , t In il In in i in iier hi oi H1 I he import of all 
warnings given him (U i 4 M» , p, 123), and that his family had had 
previous dealings with attorneys prior to the present I *- t 
(R. 1476, p l] 4). 
The Defendant further acknowledged that, after arriving 
in Salt Lake City? he was interviewed by aqents 
Gener 1 I ' < <rM I i t« wivm .-. lice officers and that such 
statement was tape? recorded (R 1476, p. I?!), 
At the hearing the Defendant also called Dr. Michael 
DeCaria, a clinical psychologist, in support of his position that 
he was borderline retarded, easily manipulated, severely 
deficient in his ability to make decisions based on rational 
intellect, well below average in his ability to exercise free 
will, and unable to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of 
constitutional rights (R. 1476, pp. 141, 143-145, 147). 
Dr. DeCaria's testimony was effectively discredited on 
cross-examination during which he admitted that certain low 
scores on the WAIS-R intelligence (I.Q.) test could be accounted 
for due to the Defendant's socially and educationally deprived 
background (R. 1476, pp. 150-151), that he had never listened to 
the tape of the interview between the Defendant and the agents 
(R. 1476, p. 154), that in his review of the transcript of such 
tape, he acknowledged that Defendant was able to comprehend 
questions and communicate with officers (R. 1476, p. 154), that 
he administered no tests to defendant concerning his ability to 
comprehend the Miranda warning or its import (R. 1476, p. 154), 
and that the Defendant was not of such low level of intelligence 
that he was unable to understand what the Miranda warning meant 
(R. 1476, p. 155). 
On the issue of bias, Dr. DeCaria admitted that he 
testified extensively and exclusively on behalf of criminal 
defendants in cases where criminal responsibility is at issue (R. 
1476, p. 159), and that in his entire career he had never 
testified concerning a defendant's state of mind when it was not 
favorable to the defense (R. 1476, p. 163). In fact, when pushed 
on cross-examination, he estimated that he had testified on 
behalf of criminal defendants a couple of hundred times (R. 1476, 
p. 164). 
In addition to cross-examination of Dr. DeCaria, the 
State called Dr. Doris Read, a clinical psychologist, to rebut 
DeCaria's testimony. Dr. Read, in addition to personally 
interviewing and testing the Defendant (R. 1476, p. 166-167), 
also had access to the psychological tests administered by Dr. 
DeCaria (R. 1476, p. 167), an I.Q. and educational evaluation 
which Dr. Victor Cline had performed on the Singer children in 
1977 (R. 1476, p. 167), information from the Defendant's former 
tutor (R. 1476, p. 171), reports from Agents Galyan and Garcia 
who interviewed the Defendant in the car on the way down to Salt 
Lake City (R. 1476, p. 178), as well as copies of the tapes and 
transcripts of the Defendant's interview in Salt Lake City with 
Agent Garcia and Agent Ron Miller of the Attorney General's 
Office (R. 1476, p. 167). 
Among the tests which Dr. Read administered to the 
Defendant was one to specifically test his comprehension of the 
Miranda rights (R. 1476, p. 168). After responding appropriately 
to the first inquiry concerning his comprehension of those 
rights, the Defendant cut off the test, which further indicated 
to Dr. Read that he indeed understood the concept of his right to 
remain silent and was able to exert that right during the test 
itself (R. 1476, p. 173). 
Further, from her study of all the materials provided, 
including Dr. Cline's 1977 report documenting the decline in I.Q. 
testing on the part of all the Singer children after they were 
taken from the public schools, Dr. Read concluded that it was 
likely that the Defendant's present low scores on the WAIS-R test 
did not accurately reflect his true level of intellectual 
functioning, but that such scores were likely the result of his 
intellectual deprivation and the lack of stimulation occasioned 
by his parents' withdrawing of the children from the public 
school system (R. 1476, pp. 172, 175). She indicated that the 
WAIS-R test is very highly correlated with academic performance 
and academic achievement (R. 1476, p. 175). Notably, in 1977, 
the Defendant's score on the WAIS-R test was higher, with his 
full scale score being 83, which was in the low average range (R. 
1476, p. 173). 
Dr. Read also testified that she reviewed the MMPI test 
administered by Dr. DeCaria, and that it showed an essentially 
normal profile (R. 1476, p. 174), contrary to Dr. DeCaria's 
assertion that it showed an abnormal profile (R. 1476, p. 155). 
She also found that Dr. DeCaria had failed to administer one 
subtest on the MMPI test, the object assembly test, and that 
after she had the Defendant perform that test, it brought up his 
performance I.Q. score into the low average range from the 
borderline mentally retarded level scored by Dr. DeCaria (R. 
1476, pp. 170-171). 
On the issue of the Defendant's submissiveness, Dr. 
Read found contradictory evidence, some suggesting that he was 
gullible and some suggesting that he was very suspicious and 
mistrustful (R. 1476, p. 183). 
Dr. Read further concluded there was no evidence to 
suggest that the Defendant was unable to comprehend the warnings 
he received from the officers, or that he was even particularly 
emotionally stressed during the taped interview wherein he 
appeared quite composed, able to comprehend all questions, able 
to give logical responses to the agents' questions, including the 
recollection of detail, and that, in short, there was nothing to 
indicate that his cognitive faculties were in any way impaired 
(R. 1476, pp. 174-176). 
Further, Dr. Read testified that, contrary to his 
testimony at the hearing, the Defendant told her that he did 
understand the form which he read and which the officers read to 
him at the time he signed the Miranda waiver form (R. 1476, p. 
179). She also noted from the officers' reports that the Miranda 
warning was not just read by the Defendant off the form, but read 
to him by the officers, who took time to explain to him exactly 
what it meant (R. 1476, p. 182). This was corroborated by the 
testimony of Agent Allan Galyan of A.T.F. during his testimony at 
the hearing (R. 1476, pp. 198-200, 213-214). 
In addition to Dr. Read and Agent Galyan, Agent Felix 
Garcia of A.T.F. (R. 1476, pp. 219-240) and Agent Ronald Miller 
of the Utah Attorney General's Office (R. 1476, pp. 240-251) were 
called as witnesses and testified at the hearing consistent with 
the above-described narrative of events. 
After reviewing the transcript of the pretrial hearing, 
as well as the tape of the Defendant's statements to Agent Miller 
and Agent Garcia, together with a transcript thereof, the trial 
court concluded that the statements were voluntarily made by the 
Defendant in compliance with his Miranda rights, and therefore 
denied his motion to suppress (Tr. 11-18, pp. 147-150). 
A. VOLUNTARINESS OF STATEMENTS 
All statements made by the Defendant concerning the 
events which had transpired were made after a full and complete 
written and oral acknowledgment by the Defendant that he 
understood his rights and was willing to waive them. Agent 
Galyan went through them individually and exhaustively with the 
Defendant at the time he first came into contact with him in 
Marion. 
The determination of the voluntariness of a confession 
or admission requires the Court to consider the "totality of all 
the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the 
accused and the details of the interrogation." Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); State v. Hegelman, 717 P.2d 1348 
(Utah 1986); State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233 (Utah 1985). The 
voluntariness of a confession need be established only by a 
preponderance of the evidence, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 
(1972); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986); State v. 
Moore, 697 P.2d at 236. 
In looking at the circumstances of the instant case, it 
is clear that the police conduct was free from the abuses that so 
concerned the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966). The period of interrogation was not unusually long, no 
threats or promises were made to induce the Defendant to talk, he 
was fully advised of his rights and expressly waived them upon 
his initial contact with the agents, and later acknowledged that 
he was still aware of his rights when he was interviewed at the 
Marshal's office in Salt Lake City. The one time when he 
indicated he did not feel like talking with Agents Galyan and 
Garcia in the car, they ceased interrogation. While Garcia did 
engage the Defendant in casual conversation after a brief period 
of silence, such conversation was neither interrogation nor its 
functional equivalent since it was not likely to evoke an 
incriminating response from the Defendant. Not every question 
posed in a custodial setting is equivalent to interrogation, but 
only those reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses. 
[Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).] United States 
v. Gonzales-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 47 
U.S. 913 (1985). 
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the United 
States Supreme Court differentiated between a suspect's 
invocation of his right to silence and that of his right to 
counsel, and set a higher standard for the government to meet in 
demonstrating a valid waiver of the right to counsel, once 
invoked. Thus an accused may not be subject to further 
interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, 
unless the accused himself initiates further communication with 
the police. Even under the higher standard of Edwards, which is 
not applicable here since the defendant never invoked his right 
to counsel, police are not deemed to impermissibly "initiate" 
renewed interrogation by engaging in routine conversation with a 
suspect about unrelated matters. 451 U.S. at 490 (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
Further, the fact that Agent Garcia may have been 
friendly and congenial while making casual conversation with the 
Defendant as they rode in the car does not render the Defendant's 
subsequent statements coerced or involuntary. Miller v. Fenton, 
796 F.2d 598 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 989 (1986). In 
Miller, the police officer's words of comfort (You're not a 
criminal") and frequent repetition of assurances ("We're going to 
see that you get the proper help") to make the defendant feel 
more comfortable about speaking to the officer did not render his 
subsequent confession involuntary, where it was found to 
nevertheless be the product of the defendant's own desire to 
talk. Id. at 611-612. In the instant case Agent Garcia made no 
such assurances, promises, or misrepresentations to the Defendant 
during the three minutes in question (Tr. 1476, p. 51). He 
simply engaged in a casual conversation and treated the Defendant 
like he would treat anybody else (Tr. 1476, p. 234). After a 
brief period of casual conversation, the Defendant volunteered 
that maybe he would tell the agents the whole story (Tr. 1476, p, 
203). The facts do not support Defendant's claim that his 
confession was coerced through friendly manipulation by Agent 
Garcia or that his statements were made involuntarily. 
Further, the Defendant's possible ignorance of the full 
consequences of his decision to waive his rights does not vitiate 
the voluntariness of his statements. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 
298 (1985); see also, Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987). 
Nor is voluntariness vitiated by any moral or psychological 
pressures to talk emanating from sources other than official 
coercion. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 304-305. It is sufficient that 
the waiver is a product of free and deliberate choice rather than 
intimidation, coercion or deception. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 
412 (1986). 
Finally, to the extent the Defendant may be claiming 
his statements were involuntary due to any mental illness or 
deficiency on his part, a recent United States Supreme Court case 
is instructive. In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), 
the defendant confessed to a murder after receiving his Miranda 
warning and waiving his rights. Shortly thereafter, he was sent 
to the state hospital after he became visibly disoriented during 
an interview. A psychiatrist discovered that the defendant 
believed he was following the voice of God in confessing, and 
based upon the psychiatrist's testimony that the defendant 
suffered from a psychosis that interfered with his ability to 
make free and rational choices, the trial court suppressed his 
confession despite the fact the police had done nothing wrong or 
coercive in securing the confession. The court also found that 
the defendant's mental state vitiated his attempted waiver of the 
right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination. The 
Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Federal 
Constitution required suppression of a confession when the 
defendant's mental state interfered with his "rational intellect" 
and "free will." 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, stating: 
We think that the Supreme Court of 
Colorado erred in importing into this area of 
constitutional law notions of "free will" 
that have no place there. There is obviously 
no reason to require more in the way of a 
"voluntariness" inquiry in the Miranda waiver 
context than in the Fourteenth Amendment 
confession context. The sole concern of the 
Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was basedf 
is governmental coercion. See United States 
v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977); 
Miranda, supra, [384 U.S.], at 460. Indeed, 
the Fifth Amendment privilege is not 
concerned "with moral and psychological 
pressures to confess emanating from sources 
other than official coercion." Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). The 
voluntariness of a waiver of this privilege 
has always depended on the absence of police 
overreaching, not on "free choice" in any 
broader sense of the word. . . . 
479 U.S. at 169-170. 
The Supreme Court went on to state: 
Respondent urges this Court to adopt his 
"free will" rationale, and to find an 
attempted waiver invalid whenever the 
defendant feels compelled to waive his rights 
by reason of any compulsion, even if the 
compulsion does not flow from the police. 
But such a treatment of the waiver issue 
would "cut this Court's holding in [Miranda] 
completely loose from its own explicitly 
stated rationale." Beckwith v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 341, 345, (1976). Miranda 
protects defendants against government 
coercion leading them to surrender rights 
protected by the Fifth Amendment; it goes no 
further than that. Respondent's perception 
of coercion flowing from the "voice of God," 
however important or significant such a 
perception may be in other disciplines, is a 
matter to which the United States 
Constitution does not speak. 
479 U.S. at 170-171. 
Thus, even in cases involving mentally deficient 
defendants, coercive government misconduct is necessary to 
establish involuntariness of a statement. 
The Defendant's characterization of his low level of 
intelligence, gullibility and lack of understanding of the 
Miranda warning were matters which were in dispute at the 
hearing. The Court was not obligated to accept the Defendant's 
self-serving claims in this regard. There was ample evidence 
presented at the hearing to justify the Court's factual finding 
that the Defendant's admissions were voluntarily made, thus 
rejecting his claim that he was particularly susceptible to 
subtle police influence which he claims existed and which he 
claimed rendered his statements involuntary. 
The Court should employ a "clearly erroneous" standard 
of review as to the lower court's factual finding on the issues 
of whether the police used coercive tactics and whether the 
Defendant was particularly susceptible to any such tactics. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert. 
granted, P.2d , (Utah 1989). In the instant case, the 
trial court concluded that the officers did not engage in any 
trickery, coercion, psychological pressure, or the like. (Tr. 
11-18, p. 148). 
Applying the above authority to the facts of the 
instant case, it is clear that there was ample evidence to 
support the trial court's ruling that the Defendant's statements 
were freely and voluntarily made (Tr. 11-18, p. 148). 
B. WAIVER OF RIGHTS 
The Miranda decision requires that a person in custody 
prior to being interrogated be advised of his rights under the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments under circumstances where any 
subsequent waiver of those rights is voluntary, knowing and 
intelligent. Johnson v. Zerbstf 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1968). 
A suspect must in some manner affirmatively invoke his 
right to silence or counsel. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
473 (1966); United States v. Bosbe# 675 F.2d 1174, 1182 n.13 
(11th Cir. 1982); State v. Hegelman, 717 P.2d 1348 (Utah 1986). 
A waiver need not always be explicit, but may be established 
through understanding of rights and a particular course of 
conduct. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); State v. 
Hegelman, 717 P.2d at 1349. 
The court must look at the totality of the 
circumstances to determine if a valid waiver has been made. Fare 
v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979); State v. Hegelman, 717 
P.2d at 1349. A waiver of Miranda rights need be established 
only by a preponderance of the evidence. Colorado v. Connelly, 
only by a preponderance of the evidence. Colorado v. Connelly, 
479 U.S. at 168-169. Finally, Miranda principles do not apply to 
volunteered statements of the accused made without interrogation. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 478. 
In this case, there can be little doubt as to the 
sufficiency of the initial advisement and waiver of rights which 
is described above and which occurred between the Defendant and 
Agent Galyan. After going over the document carefully and 
completely, the Defendant signed both the acknowledgment of 
understanding and waiver section of the form. As the United 
States Supreme Court stated in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 
(1986): 
Once it is determined that a suspect's 
decision not to rely on his rights was 
uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could 
stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he 
was aware of the State's intention to use his 
statements to secure a conviction, the 
analysis is complete and the waiver is valid 
as a matter of law. . . . 
475 U.S. at 422-423 (footnote omitted). 
After about seven minutes of questioning about the 
bombing of the Mormon church, the Defendant told the agents that 
he didn't feel like talking to them (R. 1476, p. 202). Although 
questioning ceased concerning the bombing or any other criminal 
offenses, Agent Garcia, after a short period of silence, did 
engage in casual conversation with Agent Galyan and the Defendant 
(R. 1476, p. 223). Within three minutes the Defendant said maybe 
he would tell them the story, which he proceeded to do (R. 1476, 
p. 203). 
There is an initial question whether the Defendant's 
statement to Agent Galyan that he didn't know if he felt like 
talking to him was an invocation of his fifth amendment right. 
If one assumes that it was, the doctrine of Michigan v. Mosley, 
423 U.S. 96 (1975), comes into play. 
In Mosley, the Supreme Court dealt with the situation 
where the accused invoked his right to remain silent (as opposed 
to his right to counsel as per Edwards v. Arizona). In holding 
admissible a subsequent custodial statement by the defendant, the 
Court emphasized that the defendant's right to cut off 
questioning was "scrupulously honored," notwithstanding the fact 
that he was interrogated two hours after invoking his rights by 
other officers who re-advised him of his rights. 
Unlike the per se proscription in cases where the right 
to counsel is invoked (Edwards), the Court has laid down no such 
rigid rule governing re-questioning of a suspect who initially 
invokes his right to remain silent. Wilson v. Henderson, 584 
F.2d 1185 (2d Cir. 1978). The question is whether under all the 
circumstances it can be said that the resumption of questioning 
is consistent with scrupulous observance of the right to cut off 
questioning. United States v. Mearns, 443 F.Supp. 1244, 1253 
(D. Del. 1978); Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d at 1187. 
In the instant case the Defendant, not pursuant to 
interrogation by the agents, volunteered that maybe he would tell 
them the story (R. 1476, p. 203). This occurred about three 
minutes after he stated he didn't feel like talking to them and 
less than fifteen minutes from having extensively reviewed his 
rights with Agent Galyan and having signed the acknowledgment and 
waiver form (R. 1476, pp. 202-203; Exhibit C-10). 
Under the circumstances where the agents did no more 
than engage in casual conversation not related to a criminal 
investigation during the three minute period, they did 
"scrupulously honor" the Defendant's right to cut off questioning 
at any time. This is especially true under the circumstances 
where the agents were involved in transporting the Defendant to 
Salt Lake City and some casual conversation would be normal and 
expected. 
As discussed above, not all conversations or questions 
posed in a custodial setting are the equivalent of interrogation, 
but only those reasonably likely to elicit incriminating 
responses. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02. 
This is not a case in which the defendant was badgered 
or his will was overborne by persistent or coercive questioning. 
United States v. Badr, 604 F.Supp. 569 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). When one 
combines the Defendant's explicit waiver less than fifteen 
minutes earlier with his course of conduct in suggesting that he 
might tell the agents the story and then doing so, it seems clear 
that at that time he re-initiated conversation concerning the 
offenses and waived his right to remain silent. 
In Holloway v. United States, 495 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 
1974), the defendant, who had invoked his right to remain silent 
and thereafter initiated conversations with the police as he was 
being transported in a vehicle, was deemed to have thereby 
validly waived his rights to remain silent. The Court emphasized 
that the admissions made by the defendant were not the 
consequence of a formal and controlled interrogation in its 
classic sense, there was no evidence that the agents pressed an 
interrogation upon the defendant against his wishes, and the 
defendant had been fully advised of his rights three or four 
hours earlier. 1^. at 837-839. 
A similar waiver should be found by the Court in the 
instant case where the Defendant was fully advised of his rights 
only ten minutes before, where he himself re-initiated 
conversation about the events during the course of casual 
conversation with the agents after they had ceased questioning, 
and where he spoke freely and openly in a manner consistent with 
his own desire to talk. 
Once the agents and defendant arrived in Salt Lake 
City, the Defendant was introduced to Attorney General 
investigators and was again reminded of his rights prior to the 
taking of a taped statement, at which time he acknowledged his 
rights again and spoke freely to the agents during the taped 
interview. 
In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), the Supreme 
Court held that not all Miranda rule violations are Fifth 
Amendment violations, and thus a suspect who has once responded 
to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled 
from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given 
the requisite Miranda warnings. 470 U.S. at 318. 
In the instant case where the warnings were fully given 
at the outset and where no coercive questioning occurred in the 
car on the way down to the city, there should certainly be no 
suppression of the Defendant's taped statement under the 
circumstances where he was again reminded at the outset of the 
interview of the rights he had gone over less than two hours 
earlier, and where he thereafter agreed to be questioned. 
Looking at the totality of the circumstances, it is 
clear that there was ample evidence to support the trial court's 
finding that the Defendant's statements were not taken in 
violation of Miranda, and that when the right to remain silent 
was invoked, it was honored by the officers (Tr. 11-18, p. 148). 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant convicted for Manslaughter is supported 
by sufficient evidence, and the trial court properly denied his 
motion to suppress the statements he voluntarily made to agents 
after waiving his rights. His conviction should be upheld. 
DATED this ^ ' J day of October, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
C. C. HORTON II 
Assistant Attorney General 
•f^R^y^^ -<i 
